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Governmental Power and Private Property*
G. GRAHAM WAITE**
A. INTRODUCTION
THE SOURCE OF PROPERTY in the legal sense is government.' The detailed
meaning of property is found through piecing together relevant constitu-
tional provisions, court decisions, statutes and administrative decisions and
regulations in force at a given time in a given jurisdiction. These formal
evidences of the law of property, in turn, have been said to take their shape
from tradition, and ideas of social and economic policy.2 Since social and
economic policy changes as time passes, and even tradition may gradually
erode, it is to be expected that the content of property will vary with time.
3
The author wishes to state that this article is a preliminary product of a research
project on Rules of Compensability and Valuation in Highway Land Acquisition (NCHRP
Project 11-1) in process at the University of Wisconsin sponsored by The American Associa-
tion of State Highway Officials in cooperation with the Bureau of Public Roads, U. S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, and administered by the Highway Research Board through its National
Cooperative Highway Research Program, in behalf of the National Academy of Sciences-
National Research Council. Special thanks are due my colleagues in the project, economist
Professor Richard U. Ratcliff and lawyer Dean F. Massey, for their contributions to this
article through discussion of the problems with which it deals. The views expressed are my
own, however, and are not necessarily those of Professor Ratcliff or Mr. Massey. Nor does
publication of the article necessarily indicate acceptance by the National Academy of Sci-
ences, by the Bureau of Public Roads, or by any State Highway Department of the findings,
conclusions, or recommendations either inferred or specifically expressed.
" Professor of Law, the Catholic University of America.
' "In a strict legal sense, land is not 'property,' but the subject of property. The term
'property,' although in common parlance frequently applied to a tract of land or a chattel,
in its legal signification 'means only the rights of the owner in relation to it.'" Eaton v.
Boston, Concord & Montreal R.R., 51 N.H. 504, 511 (1872). Rights in land recognized
by the law are only those activities in relation to land that governmental force or the
threat thereof protects from interference by third persons or by government itself.
The extent and type of governmental force that will be used in particular cir-
cumstances to protect the favored activities detail the content of property rights.
The content in relation to interference from government may be different from the
content in relation to interference from private persons. See Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent
Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. Rev. 596, 599-604 (1954); Philbrick, Changing
Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. Rv. 691, 723-25, 728-32 (1938).
2 Kratovil & Harrison, supra note 1, at 604.
s8 d. at 598. See generally Philbrick, supra note 1.
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Often when governmental power is exercised through court decisions
pricking out the boundaries of private property rights the courts are simply
adjusting conflicts caused by disharmonious private uses of property. Deci-
sions in the field of nuisance exemplify such adjustment. The governmental
policies implemented by these decisions typically are broad, and stem from
judicial ideas of how best to achieve the greatest good from natural resources
for the greatest number of people, without departing drastically from the
attitudes toward government and property current at the time among the
people of the particular state. When governmental power over property is
exercised through statutes or ordinances and proceedings pursuant thereto,
the legislative bodies and executive personnel may be adjusting private land
use conflicts, or they may be developing a physical asset for the use and
benefit of the community.
Land use zoning ordinances establishing districts for particular uses, per-
haps controlling the size of lots, and of the size and location of buildings on
the lots, or even of the mixture of single and multi-family residential uses
with commercial uses in a planned neighborhood, exemplify the adjustment
function. Proceedings establishing highway rights of way, and preventing
premature highway obsolescence exemplify the developmental function.
Absent the protection, enterprises which generate traffic-shopping centers
and residential subdivisions, for example-would be lured to the highway's
flanks by the promise of quick transportation.
The distinction between the adjustment and developmental functions is
really superficial, remembering that zoning and allied controls may create
and preserve economic or aesthetic values while at the same time the pro-
tective aspect of legislative and executive action toward rights of way largely
adjusts highway and non-highway uses of land, even though the adjustment
may be achieved by obtaining title to property, such as the rights of access
between the highway and adjoining land.
4
Viewing the result of legislative and executive programs involving private
land as developmental, the question arises-who is to pay for the develop-
ment? The question presently is powerfully affected by the particular com-
bination of governmental powers over property that is used in a particular
instance.
The governmental powers exercised by the legislative and executive
'One commentator has suggested that government plays two roles in its activities affecting
land, that of participant and that of mediator in the competition for legal protection of
demands to use land. Activities in the participant role benefit some government "enter-
prise"-which he defines to include highway construction-whereas, according to the com-
mentator, activities in the mediator role do not. The suggestion is then made that only
private economic losses caused by government in its enterprise capacity should be con-
sidered takings, hence requiring compensation; losses of whatever severity caused by the
mediator role of government should not be compensated. Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
74 YALE L. J. 36, 62-63 (1964).
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branches, and which directly shape the content of property, are the powers
of eminent domain, taxation, and police. Of these powers, only one-eminent
domain-purports to effect a transfer of title to the government. It is true
that the taxing power may effect a transfer of title from the landowner to
the government, but only if tax delinquency occurs. But the police and tax-
ing powers effect a deprivation of land use rights virtually as final as the dep-
rivation caused by condemnation. For example, developmental rights in
the bed of a proposed street are for practical purposes gone when the pro-
posed street is adopted as part of an official map, barring the situation where
a fair return cannot be earned on the mapped land unless further develop-
ment is permitted. Development may also be effectively prevented by im-
posing a high tax on improvements. Yet in spite of these similarities in the
practical effect of the powers of eminent domain, taxation and police on the
landowner, only when eminent domain is exercised is the landowner com-
pensated for at least part of his loss. 5
OThe various state constitutions require state and local government to pay "just com-
pensation" for private property taken by eminent domain. E.g., Mo. CONST. art. III, §40.
Sometimes the phrase is "taken or damaged." See CALIF. CONST. art. 1, §14. The federal
government is under a similar obligation. U.S. CONsT. art. V. The exact size of the state or
local governmental obligation to pay laid down by the constitutions is constantly evolving
in state case law as judges interpret the meanings of "property," "taken or damaged" and
"just compensation." A dominant reality with which the judges live while making their
interpretations is that condemnation awards ultimately are paid by taxpayers interested
in economical government to individuals interested in being shielded from harm caused
by governmental activity. An effort to give some recognition to the two interests results in
paying less than the entire economic harm an individual experienced; often because the
interest invaded was not "property;" or, although the interest invaded was property, it was
not "taken or damaged;" or because to pay for the harm claimed would go beyond the re-
quirements of "just compensation," as when the measurement of the harm is "speculative."
For example, "property" of an owner whose land joins a highway does not include a right
to have the highway grade remain the same. Lewis v. State Road Dep't. 95 So. 2d 248 (Fla.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957); Horn v. City of Chicago, 403 111. 549, 87 N.E.2d 642, cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 940 (1949); Anderson v. Stuarts Draft Water Co., 197 Va. 36, 87 S.E.2d
756 (1955). But it does include a right of egress and ingress to and from the highway.
Blount County v. McPherson, 268 Ala. 133, 105 So. 2d 117 (1958); State ex rel. Morrison v.
Thelberg 86 Ariz. 263, 344 P.2d 1015; modified & aff'd, 87 Ariz. 318, 350 P.2d 988 (1960);
People ex rel. Dep't. of Public Works v. Russell, 48 Cal. 2d 189, 309 P.2d 10 (1957); Fleming
v. State Road Dep't., 157 Fla. 170, 25 So. 2d 373 (1946); Dougherty County v. Hornsby, 213
Ga. 114, 97 S.E.2d 300 (1956); Mabe v. State ex rel. Rich, 83 Idaho 222, 360 P.2d 799 (1961);
Dep't. of Public Works & Bldgs. v. Wolf, 414 Ill. 386, 111 N.E.2d 322 (1953); Hathaway v.
Sioux City, 244 Iowa 508, 57 N.W.2d 228 (1953); Anderlik v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n.,
240 Iowa 919, 38 N.W.2d 605 (1949); Riddle v. State Highway Comm'n., 184 Kan. 603, 334
P.2d 301 (1959); Royal Transit, Inc. v. Village of West Milwaukee, 266 Wis. 271, 63 N.W.2d
62 (1954).
Sometimes access rights, although drastically impaired, are not considered "taken" be-
cause of the manner in which the impairment occurred. Building a curb within the existing
right of way with 30 foot openings for exit and entrance from a truck loading dock affords
an example. State Highway Dept. v. Strickland, 213 Ga. 785, 102 S.E.2d 3 (1958). And
expenses of removing personalty from a building, or of moving the building off the con-
demned land have been held not to represent a "taking" of property. People ex. rel. Dept.
of Public Works v. Auman, 100 Cal. App. 2d 262, 223 P.2d 260 (1950); First Nat'l. Bank v.
Maine Turnpike Authority, 153 Me. 131, 136 A.2d 699 (1957); Williams v. State Highway
1967]
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B. BASIC CRITICISM AND SUGGESTED CHANGES IN THE LAWS OF COMPENSABILITY
1. Constitutional Requirement that Compensation be Paid
From the point of view of landowners, the above described situation presents
a major inconsistency of the law: although the uses to which owners are per-
mitted to put their land have been limited in similar fashion, one owner is
compensated and another is not, simply because of the government's choice6
of the tool by which to effect the limitation. One way to eliminate the incon-
sistency might be to abolish property taxes and equalize the impact on land-
owners of police power regulations and of eminent domain takings. But
there seems little practical chance that taxation of property will entirely
Comm'n., 252 N.C. 141, 113 S.E.2d 263 (1960); In re Appropriation for Highway Purposes,
167 Ohio St. 463, 150 N.E.2d 30 (1958). But damages caused by water diverted from its
normal channel by a highway construction project often have been held a taking and hence
compensable. State v. Leeson, 84 Ariz. 44, 323 P.2d 692 (1958); Sheehan v. Richmond, 100
Ga. App. 496, 111 S.E.2d 924 (1959); Dougherty County v. Long, 93 Ga. App. 212, 91 S.E.2d
198 (1956); Woods v. Inc. Town of State Centre, 249 Iowa 38, 85 N.W.2d 519 (1957);
Schmutte v. State, 147 Neb. 193, 22 N.W.2d 691 (1946); Braswell v. State Highway & Public
Works Comm'n., 250 N.C. 508, 108 S.E.2d 912 (1959).
Subjective value to the owner of the property taken is excluded from the determination
of the award, market value, where a market exists, being considered the standard of "just
compensation." See Dodge, Acquisition of Land by Eminent Domain, in BEUSCHER, LAND
USE CONTROLS-CASES AND MATERIALS 525, 531 (1966); Beuscher & Delogu, Land Use Con-
trols, Wisconsin Development Series, State of Wisconsin, Dept. of Resource Development,
V 3-5 (1966). But where only part of a tract is taken, damages to the remainder are paid as
part of just compensation, as reduced by the value of any special benefits conferred on the
land by the public project. See Dodge, supra at 533, 534-35. Problems in appraising the
value of land taken, either entirely or in part, are discussed in Ratcliff, Real Estate Valu-
ation and Highway Condemnation Awards (Univ. of Wisconsin Graduate School of Business,
Wisconsin Commerce Reports, Vol. VII, No. 6, 1966).
It should be remembered the statements above refer to the scope of the constitutional
requirements to pay compensation. Legislatures frequently have enlarged the obligation by
statute.
0 The basis of choice is hard to state. Tradition may account for some choices. For ex-
ample, the right of exclusive possession is so vital in the property concept, both to law-
trained persons and to others, its elimination is virtually the prototype to Americans of a
taking-hence eminent domain is used. Similarly, the creation of districts in which different
uses of land are permitted-all pursuant to a rational plan for districting at least a con-
siderable portion of a coherent area such as a city or riverbasin-is well known to city
dwellers and, as long as reasonable benefit from the premises may be enjoyed within the
permitted uses, compensation is not expected-hence the police power is used. The different
expectations in the two instances perhaps stem from popular ideas of property being the
land rather than rights to use it in various ways.
When some interest in land less than the fee and other than possession is to be acquired,
tradition is less potent in guiding choice and pragmatic factors become important. Can the
unit of government contemplating the elimination of private rights afford to pay for them?
Will there be an outcry from the people if payment is not made? Will there be sufficient
possibilities of use left to most landowners to allow a police regulation to be constitution-
ally applied to the bulk of the land involved? Decisions on such questions involve judgment
and hence may be expected to be decided differently by different planners without any
single decision necessarily being arbitrary. Yet the difference in impact to landowners re-
mains drastic. For example, building set-back lines from streets are established partly to
improve safety in use of the streets and partly to improve the appearance of buildings
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cease, in view of the severely limited sources of revenue for local govern-
ment. As to the two other powers of government over land, their impacts on
landowners can be equalized either by adjusting the police power impact to
conform with that of eminent domain or vice versa. To do the former would
require paying the value of all potential land uses wiped out by police regu-
lations. The payment could be accompanied by requiring that the value of
the barred uses be paid to the governmental unit that imposed the controls
when and if the uses later became lawful, appraised as of the time they re-
turned to legality. Thought also could be given to a requirement that gov-
ernment be paid for rises in land value caused by the government action
when such rises were realized by sale or mortgage borrowing. Such a pro-
vision would recognize one surface distinction between eminent domain and
police power, i.e., the latter power leaves title to affected land undisturbed in
form, hence allowing the private owner a chance either to develop the land
to the forbidden uses if the ban is lifted, or to enjoy the benefits of rises in land
values that later occur, whereas eminent domain transfers title to the govern-
ment and thus forestalls later private benefits from the land taken. Consider-
ing the multitude of police regulations affecting land uses, and that probably
the bulk of them are imposed by local government, the expense of such a
program of compensation may prove prohibitive, unless the application of
police regulations was reduced or taxation increased.
7
erected along the street. Scenic easements along highways are established to preserve aes-
thetic values important to society. Each control leaves the landowner free to use the land
controlled in a number of ways. But the set-back lines often are established by police power,
the easements by purchase or eminent domain. Who is to say the land use control tool used
might not have been the opposite in each instance? And how much comfort does the land-
owner who is affected by the set-back line and receives no compensation derive from know-
ing the choice of tool was reasonable, when he contemplates the owner affected by the
easement who does receive compensation?
"The idea that diminution of property value caused by police power regulations should
be compensated is riot new. See Dunham, From Rural Enclosure to Re-Enclosure of Urban
Land, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1238, 1253-54 (1960). Experience under zoning ordinances based
on eminent domain makes it doubtful that compensation on such a scale is feasible. The
following critique of eminent domain zoning in Minnesota appeared in the 1920's.
It was suggested that zoning proceeded too slowly to be effective when diminutions it
caused in property value were compensated. Less than 1 per cent of the area of Minneapolis,
122 per cent of St. Paul, and V of 1 per cent of Duluth had been zoned under the 1915
eminent domain zoning act, whereas under the 1913 police power acts, 23%, .27 of 1%, and
of 1% of the respective cities had been zoned. The critic then continued:
The eminent domain act was open to additional objections. The expense of con-
demnation and assessment proceedings in each case was an appreciable item, and
would have made it well-nigh prohibitive to have zoned the entire city at one time by
this method. Naturally, there was always a certain amount of guesswork and un-
certainty in the damages awarded and the assessments levied. It was said, also, that the
act lent itself to a sort of extortion; for the owner of a vacant lot of appropriate size
in a good residential district had only to announce his intention to erect a store or
apartment house thereon to induce neighboring residents to circulate a petition for a
restriction with the result that he received damages at their expense. Whther anyone
profited unjustly in this way would be hard to prove. A final objection to the eminent
1967]
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Reforming eminent domain practice to simulate the practice followed in
testing the validity of police power regulations does seem feasible, how-
ever. The reform would not affect appraisal technique;8 it would change the
significance of fixing the "value" of property.
It is not proposed to push the reform to the outer limits of constitution-
ality as now understood. Occasionally one finds courts suggesting today that if
a police regulation leaves an owner able to earn the real estate taxes on his
land, the regulation is lawful in its application to the tract in question.9 It
may be wise to adopt a less rigorous test of taking where highway right of way
acquisition is concerned. The fiscal resources of the states and federal gov-
domain procedure was the cast-iron rigidity of the resulting restriction. The entire
public gained a sort of restrictive easement upon the land in question, which it was
almost impossible to change since each owner who had paid assessments to obtain the
restriction had a right of action to enforce it ...
Each lot in the district affected was thus subjected to a restriction which could be
wiped out only as it had been created...
Anderson, Zoning in Minnesota; Eminent Domain vs. Police Power, 16 NAT'L. MUNIC. REV.
624, 628-29 (1927).
The Minnesota act that was the subject of the above criticism provided for the creation
of zoning districts upon the petition of 50% of the owners of real estate in the proposed
district. Minn. Laws 1915, Ch. 128, §1. The possibility of blackmailing private owners could
be eliminated by making public authorities responsible for developing the zoning scheme,
as commonly is done under police power ordinances. However, this only shifts the spectre
of blackmail to the public authorities, and through them to the taxpayers generally. The
payments contemplated by the Minnesota act were to be financed by special assessments
against the property benefited by the zoning. Minn. Laws 1915, Ch. 128, § 3 Fifth. Even if the
payments were financed by general funds of the zoning governmental unit the rigidity of
the restrictions will remain. Although perhaps no specific private individual will have
acquired a property right in the restricted land if financing is by general funds, the zoning
government will have, and it will be as inhibited in giving it away in the future if the
restriction becomes undesirable as it is inhibited in giving away other public property.
Another criticism of compensating losses in property values caused by public controls of
land use is that it would make legislative bodies too cautions to enact land use controls
sufficiently vigorous to deal effectively with today's pressing problems of land use. BEUSCHER,
LAND USE CONTROLS-CASES AND MATERIALS 539 (4th ed. 1966). Professor Beuscher is writing
specifically of consequences to be expected if inverse condemnation is allowed as a remedy
against a police power control that is unconstitutional in its application to a particular
tract of land. Timid public controls perhaps are even more likely if compensation of prop-
erty losses is the general rule. See BEUSCHER, supra at 545-47.
"Ratcliffe, supra note 5, describes conventional appraisal practice today as attempting to
correlate three different measurements of value, each based on different data. The three
bases of value are cost less accrued depreciation, income, and market data. After pointing out
that courts have directed market value be sought as a basis for a condemnation award,
Professor Ratcliff urges that the only form of market value which is susceptible of objective
estimation and determined by the market is the most probable selling price of the subject
property if exposed to the market for a reasonable time. Estimating the most probable
selling price requires predicting future behavior of real people; of the three traditional
approaches, only the third-market data-is helpful for this purpose. The Ratcliff analysis
is highly recommended reading for lawyers concerned with the condemnation process.
I See the concurring opinion of Justice Currie, in which Justice Dieterich joined, in Nick
v. State Highway Comm'n, 13 Wis. 2d 511, 109 N.W. 2d 71 (1961). Justice Currie states:
The writer of this opinion believes . . . that highway access rights are but one of a
bundle of rights which appertain to a parcel of real estate.
[Vol. XVI
Governmental Power and Private Property
ernment acquiring the right of way are far greater than those of local gov-
ernment, which for the most part imposed the controls in relation to which
the tax test of taking emerged. Greater ability to pay suggests there should be
greater readiness to pay as well.
a. "Taking" to mean inability to earn a reasonable return
The compensation inconsistency now existing between eminent domain and
police power actions can be materially reduced while staying well within
constitutional limits. The key lies in redefining "taking" or "taking or dam-
aging" as used in the just compensation clauses of the various constitutions.
"Taking" should only occur when the land or interests in land remaining to
the owner immediately after the governmental action in question is not of
practical utility. Lack of practical utility, in the case of commercial property,
would be shown by inability to earn a reasonable return on the value of the
entire tract, appraised immediately before, and without regard to, the action
taken.10 Non-commercial property could be treated similarly by imputing a
return to it.
What return is reasonable depends in part on the circumstances of the
landowner, and those circumstances of which objective evidence is adduced
should enter into the decision of specific cases. It is impossible to state in
advance of actual litigation all the circumstances relevant to fixing a reason-
able return. This writer has suggested elsewhere" that they should include
the federal income tax bracket to which the landowner belongs and the
depreciation allowances he is making-the higher the tax bracket and the
higher the depreciation allowance, the lower the return that could be
deemed reasonable. Other relevant factors might be the average rate of re-
turn earned in the locality by similar real estate developments, and by other
Zoning legislation enacted in the interest of the general welfare may have the effect of
extinguishing one or more of the rights embraced in the entire bundle without the
necessity of the state or municipality paying compensation to the landowner. In case
of zoning enactments the test employed is whether, viewing the property as a whole,
there has in reality been a taking without compensation in that confiscation of the
property has in effect occurred by depriving the owner of all beneficial use of his
property. (Emphasis added). 13 Wis. 2d 511, 518, 109 N.W. 2d 71, 74 (1961).
And in Arvene Bay Const. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 228, 15 N.E. 2d 587, 590 (1938), the
New York court said:
The property, then, must for the present remain unimproved and unproductive, a
source of expense to the owner, or must be put to some non-conforming use.
The court went on to say that $4,566 of taxes were levied on the land during the nine years
it concededly was unsuitable for any conforming use, in addition to assessments of several
thousand dollars. The court then declared the ordinance "is in substance a taking of the
land prohibited by the Constitution of the United States and by the Constitution of the
State." 278 N.Y. 222, 233, 15 N.E.2d 587, 592 (1938).
10 E.g., as to zoning, see 8 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§25.43, 25.45, 25.167 (3d
ed. 1957); as to official map see Waite, infra note 11, at 4, 6.
1 Waite, The Official Map and the Constitution in Maine, 15 MAINE L. Rav. 3, 12-15
(1963).
1967]
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investments, local or otherwise, of comparable risk and possibility of gain.
For example, if the real estate in question was fully and properly developed
in a stable community, "blue chip" corporate stock might give the proper
comparison. If the real estate was farm land being held for future sub-
dividing, it might be compared to "businessman's risk" stock. The possibility,
already mentioned, that mere ability to earn the real estate taxes may sus-
tain police regulations also appears germane, as do comparable expert pre-
dictions of the impact of the public improvement on the value of the rem-
nant parcel. In appropriate circumstances a jury might conclude that the
chance of capital gain was so probable and of such magnitude as itself to
afford all the compensation justice requires.
Whatever the factors relevant to a reasonable rate of return in a given
case, it is peculiarly appropriate that the determination of reasonableness be
made by the jury. The determination is a step in the process of deciding
whether just compensation must be paid-a decision largely grounded in
in the mores of society.'2 Twelve jurymen may reflect social mores to a
greater extent than can a judge or any other individual.
The expected operation of the new definition of taking may be illustrated
by a few examples. Imagine the acquisition of a right of way 300 feet wide
across the outer 300 feet of a rectangular pasture 1000 acres in area which
was part of a western cattle ranch. Assume the belt of land acquired is 40
acres in area and contains no improvements other than fencing. It seems
likely in such circumstances the rancher will earn a lower return on his prop-
perty with a 960 acre pasture than with a 1000 acre one, but the return
probably will still be reasonable in relation to the value of the ranch im-
mediately before the acquisition. Therefore no taking in the constitutional
sense has occurred and no payment is required.'3 At the other extreme, sup-
pose an owner's entire tract is acquired. Since the acquisition will leave the
owner with no land whatever, and hence he will be able to earn no return at
all, and will have no land on which possibly to experience a capital gain, a
taking has occurred and compensation must be paid. Perhaps only access
If, as suggested in note 5, supra, the process of determining condemnation awards is
one of mediation between the landowner and the taxpayers, whether the result is "fair"
is determined by general attitudes in society toward certain critical questions. Examples
may include: What is the proper relationship between private property and the public as
represented by government? Does it make a difference whether the level of government
concerned is local, state, or federal, considering that the three levels have differing re-
sponsibilities and fiscal resources? What maximum total portion of private income may
properly be exacted in taxes? How rapidly should highways, schools, urban renewal, and
other public improvement projects be implemented? Just as the "fairness" of an award,
once made, is controlled by mores, so is the "fairness" of the determination that an award
should or should not be made in the first place.
23 In Eaton v. Boston, Concord & Montreal R.R., 51 N.H. 504 (1872), the New Hampshire
court recognized the essential similarity of denying to the owner certain use rights in an
entire tract and of denying his title to the small portion of the tract. The Eaton case suggests
compensation should be denied in both instances, assuming a fair return can still be earned.
[Vol. XVI
Governmental Power and Private Property
rights are acquired. Whether a reasonable return still may be earned in such
an instance will depend on the availability of other access and its utility.
When the acquisition severs a tract into two parcels compensability will de-
pend on whether a reasonable return may be earned on the parcels relative
to the value of the entire tract immediately prior to the acquisition. Sup-
pose non-commercial property such as an owner-occupied residence is ac-
quired. Compensability would hinge on the estimated return imputable to
the property immediately after the governmental action occurred. If such
imputed return was reasonable in relation to the "before" value of the prop-
erty, no compensation would be needed. If the property be a public park
and it is determined the remnant parcel is not susceptible to other use, com-
pensability might depend on whether it is still usable as a park by a sufficient
number of people to make its per-visitor-cost comparable to that of other
comparable park;.
A convenient :means of adopting and administering the new standards
might be to enact legislation defining "taking" and the method of determin-
ing a "reasonable return" for constitutional purposes. The statute then
should provide explicitly for paying compensation when the government
acquires either an entire tract or all the rights a particular claimant has in a
tract, since under the suggested test a taking always would occur in these
situations. For all other situations the statute should create a rebuttable pre-
sumption that no taking has occurred, and provide a period of time within
which claimants might bring suit to try to overcome the presumption.
2. The measure of just compensation
The present system of paying the market value of property interests acquired
by eminent domain creates another inequity favoring landowners whose
property rights are condemned over those whose property rights are dimin-
ished by application of police power controls. The latter owners may be
forced to accept a reasonable return on their land, presumably this would be
a lower return than could have been earned had the police regulations not
been imposed. The Constitution has not been thought to require the owner
to be made whole as to his return, by government paying him the difference
between the return possible to be earned on the property rights remaining
after imposition of the regulation and the return that would have been
earned on the totality of property rights available for use prior to the regu-
lation.14 Yet when an interest in land is acquired through eminent domain,
1, Police power regulations often increase the return from land, of course, as when zoning
restrictions are changed by amendment, exception, or other device to permit uses higher
in economic value than those formerly permitted. See Dewar, Zoning Reforms Asked in
Wake of Indictments, Washington Post, Oct. 8, 1966, p. DI. There is no constitutional
requirement that private benefits from public action be paid the government. Since the
government regulations effect this rise in return, however, the landowner's situation is
1967]
Catholic University Law Review
the theory of the law imposes no similar risk that the owner accept less
compensation for the property taken than he could have obtained had the
public acquisition not occurred. Instead, the attempt is made to pay the
owner just what he would have received had he sold the property in the
normal manner.
Today it is hard to justify the different compensation philosophies applied
to landowners in eminent domain and in police power matters. When real
property was thought to be land in the physical sense, if such a time ever really
existed,' 5 and a taking only occurred if government acquired the right of
possession, the distinction between "taking" and "regulation" probably
seemed plausible. The distinction suggested a reason for not compensating
when only regulation had occurred-no property had been taken. Today this
distinction is seen to be illusory.'6 At first blush it seems still true that legal
title to property taken under eminent domain is transferred to the govern-
ment, whereas title to property regulated under the police power is not. But
remembering property to be a bundle of rights, it is clear this distinction,
too, is illusory. The substantive content of title is largely rights of use, and in
both situations a transfer has occurred-under eminent domain all rights of
analogous to that of an owner, part of whose land has been condemned for a project that
ultimately benefits the remaining part. Special benefits are set off against damages in
computing a condemnation award (Dodge, supra note 5, at 534-35) yet the beneficiary of
police power regulations is presently allowed to remain undisturbed in his gains, and thus
in this situation appears to have an advantage over the condemnee. A tax on the increased
return created by the police regulation might help correct the inequity. It may be men-
tioned that Montgomery County, Maryland, is reported studying a tax on zoning profits,
although apparently the purpose is revenue rather than equity. Washington Post, Dec. 20,
1966, p. Cl, col. 3; C6, col. 1-2.
15 Even Blackstone, who considered part of real property to consist of corporeal heredi-
taments,-"substantial and permanent object'"-also considered another part to be "in-
corporeal" hereditaments which could not be handled. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARES 16-17
(1771).
16 See Beuscher & Delogu, Land Use Controls, Wisconsin Development Series, State of
Wisconsin, Dept. of Resource Development (1966), ch. V. at p. 3 of chapter V the authors
state, "It is clear that some takings (eminent domain proceedings) require just compensa-
tion, while others (regulatory limitations) do not." In describing the approach used by
judges in distinguishing the two types of taking, the authors say at pp. v-3, 4: The goal
has been to strike a balance between the needed public programs and regulations on one
hand and private interests on the other .... It is difficult to predict whether a court will
be struck by the importance and community need for a given governmental action and
uphold uncompensated regulation or in spite of public benefits will call the action a
taking of private property which must be compensated. [Finally, after saying that in an
earlier day property was thought to be land itself and therefore physical occupany was
necessary to a taking, they say:] But today property is conceptualized as an intangible cable
of interests. One or more of these interests (strands in the cable) may be interfered with
(taken, in a sense) without either physical occupation of the land or such a complete
diminution in the value of the full cable of property interests as to require the payment
of compensation. Clearly, land use regulations and other governmental programs which
deprive landowners of some alternative use privileges and accordingly of dollar values fall
into this definitional framework.
Id. at v-4, 5.
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use comprising the interest in land condemned have been transferred,
under police regulations some of the rights of use have been, at least in the
sense that the private owner no longer can exercise them until they are re-
leased by the pertinent governmental body for renewed private use. Here
again, an identical approach to compensation of landowners affected by
police power restrictions or eminent domain proceedings is indicated, with
only the amount of compensation differing under the two powers because
the degree of interference with possible private uses of land is different.
One more possible reason for the present different approaches to compen-
sation used under the two governmental powers may be mentioned. Police
power regulations always leave the affected landowner with title to some use
rights, among which is included the right of possession, whereas eminent
domain proceedings often take all the private rights in the property in-
terest condemned. Hence under police power regulations, the owner retains
property that may participate in general rises in property values created by
the regulation and thus be compensated for his loss. But the owner whose
property interest is condemned retains nothing that may similarly share in
economic values created by the public project; therfore he must be com-
pensated by a money payment from the government. This distinction also
breaks down. First, land values do not always rise as a result of police power
regulations, either in general or in regard to particular lots. Second, when-
ever a partial taking occurs under eminent domain the private owner does
retain property that may share in values created by the project, yet compen-
sation is made when a partial taking occurs.
If differences in compensation philosophy in eminent domain and police
power matters are unjustified, they should be eliminated in order more
nearly to fulfill the basic mandate of due process, that persons in similar
circumstances be treated similarly. The elimination can be achieved by
forcing landowners whose property rights have been condemned to accept
compensation comparable to the reasonable return which owners of land
subject to a validly applied police regulation must accept. To do this, the
owner in eminent domain proceedings, in which the entire property is taken,
should be paid the capitalized value of a fair return on the value of the prop-
erty, determined as of the time of taking. Where a partial taking occurs,
the fair return should be based on the difference between the before and
after values of the owner's property.
The meaning of "fair return" for determining the amount of compensa-
tion can be defined by statute. The definition suggests itself from the cer-
tainty that a condemnation award will actually be paid, once the necessity of
payment has been established, compared to the uncertainty that a real estate
investment will produce profits. In effect, the determination that compensa-
tion must be paid converts the risky investment in real estate to an invest-
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ment completely free of risk, such as United States government bonds.
Therefore "fair return" for determining the compensation to be paid should
be the return that could be earned by a sum equal to the value of the property
invested in government bonds on the date of the governmental action. A
difficulty arises in determining the percentage rate at which to capitalize
the return thus determined. The rate on government bonds tends to be low
compared to the rate expected on real estate developments because of the
lack of risk. Hence if the bond rate is used for capitalization, the award will
be larger than if the real estate rate is used. Using the real estate rate is incon-
sistent with having converted the investment to one similar to government
bonds. Yet using the real estate rate will result in an award of the type needed
to eliminate the differences in eminent domain and police power philosophy
and hence might be called "the fair rate of capitalization." The award may
be expected to be substantial, yet less than the amount obtainable if the
property had been sold in the normal manner. Thus the owner whose land
is subjected to eminent domain would shoulder part of the real estate costs
caused by the eminent domain proceedings, just as the owner now does
whose land is depreciated in value by police power regulations.
To illustrate application of the new measure of compensation, imagine
that the right of way condemned includes an apartment building. Imagine
also that all the owner's property interests were included in the condemna-
tion, hence compensation must be paid. The amount to be paid would be
derived by first applying against the appraised value of the property the ef-
fective interest rate on United States government bonds current when the
state acquired the property. Assuming the appraised value of the property
was $100,000 and that the effective interest rate on government bonds was
six per cent, the fair annual return would be $6,000. The rate of return ex-
perienced locally on comparable apartment buildings would be determined
from testimony. Assume it was eight per cent. The award to be paid the land-
owner would be $6,000 capitalized at eight per cent, or $75,000. In the event
of a partial taking, the same process would be followed except that the sum
on which the equivalent bond return would be figured would be the differ-
ence between the appraised before and after values. Non-commercial prop-
erties in private use, such as owner-occupied residences, may be handled by
using an imputed return. It is hard to say how to handle those in public use,
such as a city park. Perhaps it is unnecessary to change the present mode of
determining the award to be made for such properties since they are now so
infrequently subject to police regulations-there is in effect no police prac-
tice affecting such properties to which it is worthwhile to conform eminent
domain practice. 7
17It should be pointed out that adoption of the new standard of compensation here
described does not appear to the writer to lessen the pertinence of suggestions the writer
has made elsewhere for reducing land acquisition costs to the government. See Mandelker
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3. Who is entitled to just compensation
Assuming the basic changes outlined are made to render the impact of
eminent domain and the police power on landowners more uniform, a
question arises as to which owners of land affected by government pro-
grams should be allowed a chance to receive compensation. Presently, if an
existing highway is relocated, owners of land abutting the old right of way
are denied compensation if the new right of way does not cross their land.18
The same is true if an existing highway and the property along it remain
physically undisturbed, yet, through completion of a segment of the inter-
state system, the highway is relegated to use only by local traffic.' 9 Often
courts deny compensation for loss of access when the loss was caused by
structures placed within the right of way of an existing road.20 Yet in all
these situations, the land affected may decline in value as much or more
than does land affected in ways that presently call for compensation.
All owners of land whose value declines by virtue of government action,
either of the illustrated types or otherwise, should have compensation avail-
able to them, within the framework of the new definitions of taking and
compensation previously sketched. To protect the government against pay-
ing for harm it (lid not cause, the burden of proving causation by the gov-
ernment should be placed on the compensation claimant.
4. Direct federal payment for certain damages
Increasing the circumstances in which landowners have standing in court to
& Waite, A Study of Future Acquisition and Reservation of Highway Rights-of-Way, U.S.
Bureau of Public Roads (Mimeo) (1963). The suggestions were aimed at retaining, for the
public, economic values created by public construction of highway or other works, and
preventing over-compensation of landowners which may occur when severance damages
for a partial taking are paid at the time of taking, only to find the remnant parcel being
sold a relatively short time later for a substantially higher price than its appraised value
at the time of severance. In summary, the suggestions included installment payment of
acquisition costs-preferably in conjunction with renegotiation of severance damage
awards whenever the remnant parcel is sold within a stated time following the taking at a
price exceeding its appraised value at the time of taking. Also, it was suggested that equita-
ble servitudes, in certain circumstances, no longer be considered property for which the
government would have to pay compensation. The useful life of the highway might be
extended, by protecting it from destructive lineside uses, if the state acquired a servitude
over land adjoining the highway binding the land to the use to which it is put when the
servitude is acquired and such other uses a state authority might permit. Also, it was sug-
gested that the state itself develop land values its highways create. This could be accom-
plished by the state acquiring entire tracts, where possible, and leasing to private developers
or by improving the portion not used for the right of way itself. Mandelker & Waite, supra
at iv, 82-86. The application of appropriate police power controls to reserve future rights
of way, and acquisition of rights of way well in advance of construction, of course, remain
basic cost savers for the state.
Jahoda v. State Road Dept., 106 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1958).
x' Halloway v. Purcell, 35 Cal. 2d 220, 217 P.2d 665, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 883 (1950).
20 E.g., People ex rel. Dep't. of Public Works v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 5 Cal. Rptr. 151,
352 P.2d 519 (1960).
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claim compensation in connection with governmental land acquisition will
create a considerable contingent liability for the acquiring unit of govern-
ment. The liability might well be high enough to exceed the limits of state
and local bonding power, with disastrous results to the investment rating
given any bonds proposed to be sold to finance the project. The further re-
sult would be to destroy the market for the bonds and reduce highway con-
struction by state or local government to a cash basis. To avoid the financing
problem just mentioned, the statute allowing claims to be made for damage
caused by diversion of traffic, or by structures placed within an existing right
of way, should limit them to claims arising from land acquisition programs
funded in part by the federal government. Federal legislation also would be
necessary to provide for direct payment of such damages by the Bureau of
Public Roads or other appropriate agency. The federal statute should also
provide that these payments would be in addition to highway aid funds al-
ready available, in order to avoid crimping the highway construction pro-
gram.
5. Constitutional problems and social mores
Adoption of any of the suggestions outlined above poses constitutional prob-
lems that can only be resolved by judicial decision. There are reasons to ex-
pect the suggested changes would be held constitutional. They would
achieve a more nearly equal treatment of landowners whose property de-
clines in value when government acts to create, protect, or improve public
highways or other land-based assets. At the same time, redefining taking and
compensation protects the public purse. The anticipated result is that more
landowners will be given a chance to prove their right to compensation than
presently are, but not all will succeed, and the compensation a landowner
receives who does succeed will often be less than, theoretically, he could
have obtained by sale of his property in the open market.
Whether the end result would afford acceptable treatment of both land-
owners and of taxpayers is hard to determine. Conceivably, the concept of
government obtaining land at a price lower than a private person would pay
would not be accepted by those landowners who would receive compensa-
tion under the existing law. On the other hand, the large numbers of land-
owners now receiving nothing for their losses, but who under the new sys-
tem would have a chance to receive something, presumably would be pleased
by the changed law. At the very least, the suggested changes have the virtue
of more nearly exposing the true costs of public improvements than the ex-
isting law of compensability does, thereby affording the electorate an im-
proved basis on which to determine whether the compensation is just.
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